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THE DRAMATIS PERSONAE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
By ALBERT ABEL*
Yes, Virginia, there is an administrative law.
But what is it?
Little is to be gained by simply taking another fling at Dicey for his
incautious and inexact denial,1 later recanted, 2 of its existence. It is now
recognized. But it is not quite accepted. It fits no antique mould. Not knowing
just what it includes, the legal profession has never felt quite at ease with it
nor quite known how to handle it.
True, it is as hard to say just what law itself3 is but from long association
that is seldom perceived as a question. Law is whatever lawyers concern
themselves with as being within their special range of competence. It is what
lawyers do as lawyers.
Similarly administrative law may be approached as the law relating to
what public administrators do in the course of administering.
There are also private administrators. The law as to them is not admin-
istrative law. There are public functions which are not administrative. The
law as to them is public law but it is not administrative law. A catalogue of
the activities and the actors of administrative law presumes the distinguishing
of public administration from non-public administration and from public
non-administration.
Neither distinction is easy. The difficulty in the two cases is different.
What activities are administrative is a matter of generalization, of working
towards a definition. Which ones are public is a matter of particularization,
of determining the presence or absence in a critically significant degree of the
element of performance of a task for the government.
We can only continue to talk time worn empty words about administra-
tive law until we commence by considering what we are talking about, that
is, by identifying the set, public administrators, whose actions are public
administration, the universe whose body of norms is administrative law. So
both the definitional and the descriptive missions mentioned are necessary
preliminaries.
* Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario.
1See Dicey, The Law of the Constitution, (5th ed. London: MacMillan and Co.,
1897) 327.
2 See Id. xxxviii (8th ed. 1915).
3 For an elaborate examination of this problem see, R. Pound, Jurisprudence,
(St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1959) chapters 9 and 10.
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Administration - What Is It?
Definitions can be disputed. They cannot be refuted. No definition is
either correct or incorrect. A good one is a useful one; a poor one is vacuous.
Those generally encountered are not broadly useful.
Take, for instance, legal usage both academic and judicial.
The writ-ridden content of legal rights and duties, now largely discarded
in the private law context, persists in the attempt to build a structure of
administrative law out of the materials of the prerogative writs, most notably
for purposes here relevant certiorari and prohibition. "Acting judicially",
essential to them just as a seal was to the writ of covenant or lease, entry and
ouster to ejectment, indicated that only some action was judicial. A practise
developed of labelling the rest "acting administratively". The intricacies of
English legal history - the King's Bench's sturdy assertion of a supervisory
jurisdiction over inferior tribunals, the resulting control over quarter sessions
and the transfer of the "tribunal" concept from local authorities and non-
common law judges to the miscellany of central government organs spawned
over the last two centuries - explain it.
For defining and maintaining the bounds within which those outside the
common law court hierarchy were permitted effectively to decide, there were
certiorari and prohibition, the writs for controlling inferior tribunals. Clearly
the new agencies to which supervision was being extended were not courts in
the traditional sense. They were administrative bodies. For a variety of
reasons - principled, prudential or practical as the case might be - the
courts did not want to supervise all their determinations. They acted, they
still act selectively. The basis of selection, accommodated to the available
writ machinery, was said to be whether the action in respect to any given
situation was "judicial". In application the concept has only vague if any
contours; but that is another story. With an uneasy sense of its conclusory
character, an effort was made to give it substance by contrasting it with
"acting administratively".
The contrast is neither necessary nor helpful. One might think the
actions of an administrative body, including those specifically judicial, to be
generally administrative and that it would suffice, for certiorari or prohibition,
that they were the judicial form of administrative action. The net result of
the distinction proposed was a spurious dichotomy, two undefined terms in
place of one. Floundering attempts to state a distinction followed. The most
popular has been one which dubs as administrative decisions made according
to policy or expediency whereas judicial decisions are based on law and
authority. Any familiarity with how either courts or agencies deal with them
reduces these characterizations to ideal types. Differences of degree are
elevated into differences in kind.
No doubt if the courts are to continue to supervise agency claim
resolution - and they quite evidently- are - they must have some rationale
for sorting out which they will consider. Talk about "judicial action" and
"inferior tribunals" maintains continuity with the certiorari-prohibition origins.
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It even furnishes the simulacrom of a reason, stare decisis, which, fail though
it may when one runs through specific cases looking for predictive elements,
answers the need of advocates and opinion writers for a convenient rhetoric.
If using "judicial" and "administrative" in contradistinction is felt to fortify
persuasiveness, there may be no great harm in it provided none of this very
special use spills over into other areas. The parlance of judicial remedies,
where expressions are terms of art, has no close or necessary relation with a
taxonomy of occupational roles. The litigation meaning of "administrative"
sheds no light elsewhere.
The public administration trade too places its emphasis in a way
reflecting its peculiar concerns. It has hit indeed on a key element but failed
to carry through.
While its practitioners and theorists have refrained from undertaking a
formal definition, the focus of interest has been overwhelmingly upon organi-
zational aspects. They find the essence of administration in the realm of the
0. & M. professionals, whose preoccupation is with and whose special
competence is in the administration of administration.
That is a legitimate, it is even an important aspect. It may embrace
everything relevant for business administration from which so much of admin-
istrative science is derived. A firm is a discrete community with structured
internal relationships. Its dealings with outsiders are not its administration
but its output. So administration may quite accurately be assimilated to the
arrangements bearing on the structure and functioning of its internal
operations.
With a political community, every person natural or artificial is a
member of the "organization". All are insiders. Not just the public servants
but the general population are its components, equivalent to the personnel of
a firm. In limiting their approach through organization to a consideration of
relations within the official apparatus, specialists in the science of administra-
tion have imperfectly applied the analogy from business administration.
Granted, the segment thus carved out is big enough and complex enough to
justify particular study which, incidentally, satisfies the craving for a status
claim as a distinct "profession". Calling it "administration" may be a con-
venient synecdoche. Nevertheless so labelling the part isolated for particular
attention invited the confusion, which has ensued, that here as with firms an
organization-oriented view of administration can exhaust itself on the
authority flow within a limited group.
I accept that administration may validly be conceived of as organization
but submit that it extends to the total organization, to all within the enterprise
up to the point of its interface with outsiders. The conventional stress students
of administration have placed on the interaction of official echelons alone
rests on the implicit but wrong assumption that the citizenry are outsiders.
This assumption perhaps helps sharpen the focus on what principally interests
them. In other contexts, it stunts the defining potential of treating organization
as the essence of administration and is what makes the standard literature of
the administration industry of so little use for fixing the full range of
administration.
1972]
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Continental systems like the French which have a droit administratif
face a special complication. They have two distinct bodies of law, administra-
tive and private, whose content differs and two sets of tribunals, administrative
and judicial.4 Civil law may govern some matters in an administrative pro-
ceeding. Administrative law principles apply at times in judicial litigation.
With us, the need to get an idea of what administration comprises is so that
we can make a start at a rational approach to ordering chaos. Theirs is the
converse task of elaborating the consequences of established concepts. Without
presuming to state the refinements of the scholarly debate that that effort
has occasioned, I observe that there is general agreement that administrative
law applies to the "service public" which some think critical for administrative
tribunal competence too while others refer the latter to "puissance publique".5
The controversy, whether substantial or merely semantic, bears on problems
which have no parallel in common law systems. That makes the distinctions
suggested not directly relevant.
Collateral enlightenment may be had however from the key role assigned
to the "service public", though in various ways, and in the consensus that the
actions of private bodies may yet be within the scope of administrative law
and, if so, even subject to administrative tribunals while those of public
agencies, if manifestations not of the state's political authority but of its
corporate personality, may be outside both.
Like the blind men's view of the elephant, none of these observations
about administration transcends its special approach. There is no overview.
But the second and the third each give pointers to its distinguishing features.
The administrative science schoolmen's insight that organization and admin-
istration are co-terminous needs to be freed, for useful application to public
administration, of its restricting assumption, completing the organization
universe by including the citizen component. The continental thinking empha-
sizes more what is "public" than what is "administration". What it contributes
is the notion that the relevant organization is of a function, "service public",
not just of a corps, "the public service". Operational, not formal considera-
tions, the dynamics of authority not the statics of employment structure are
important. Combined, they provide the comprehensive, coherent picture of a
concept which while not a definition can do the work of one.
Administration, they suggest, embraces all arrangements devised and
put into effect within a social entity -a state, a business, a church, what you
will - for correlating the authorities and responsibilities of members which
bear on the achievement of the entity's goals. To me this seems useful for
the purpose at hand, namely, an exploration of what administration
encompasses.
It seems at first blush to include everything officially done. Not so.
4 Brown and Garner, French Administrative Law, (London: Butterworth's, 1967) 4;
1 Auby & Drago, Traite de Contentieux Administratif, (Paris: R. Pichon et R. Dorand
Auzias, 1962), 93.
5 See 1 Auby & Drago, supra, note 4 at 323-332; Roland, Droit Administratif (11 ed.
1957) 17; Chapus, La Service Publique et la Puissance Publique (1968), 84 Rev. Du Droit
Publique et de la Science Politique 235.
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A trivial instance may be seen in the performance of ceremonial func-
tions, as in serving as official representative on an occasion of public celebra-
tion or mourning, and this even though the actor may have a speaking part.
Emotions may be affected by what he does but authorities and responsibilities
are not.
A less honorific but more numerous group whose action is not adminis-
trative is those who directly handle things only without working on or through
people. The immediate operators of government - or business - trucks or
typewriters or brooms are not engaged in administration when doing their
jobs, set for them by those who are. A like principle excludes high status
personnel too - legislative draftsmen, regional planners, research scientists,
the statistical analysts of DBS, the cameramen of the National Film Board.
Though they manipulate ideas, not materials, theirs too is a production rather
than a control function. They are administered, they do not administer.
Other examples demonstrate the effect of applying the business adminis-
tration model to administration generally. In observing how the organizational
approach used there carried administration to the point of interface with
outsiders, it was noticed that so far as public administration is concerned,
that point has in practice been wrongly placed by a tacit limitation to the
official apparatus. But, like other enterprises, governments do have contacts
outside, which mark where organization and so administration ends.
The obvious case is international or, for that matter, all voluntary inter-
governmental relations. The United Nations, the Commonwealth Secretariat,
the Council of State Governments - each has of course its own staff and
organization and by that token its own administration; one might even say
its proper administrative "law" to the extent that their internal rules can be
called law. But in its dealings with them, a state engages in external dealings
beyond its domestic system of controls. This is less evident in bilateral dealings
between separate political communities, but really no different than in the
instances mentioned. Administration ends where the power to prescribe the
structure of relationships ends.
A comparable interface in principle exists for local transactions. Only in
its governmental capacity is the state an all-inclusive organization. Where,
laying that aside, it acts in its purely corporate capacity, for instance, as a
supplier like any other in the marketplace, the bargaining partners with whom
it deals are in that context outsiders. As an entrepreneur, administration is for
it exactly what it is for any business enterprise 6.
The proposition, however true as an abstraction, is admittedly hard to
apply. This is so for two reasons. One can seldom establish that state trading
is altogether commercial. Quite commonly and always potentially it is one
kind of control mechanism for effectuating economic or other social policy.
Its exercise to that end is administration for it is therein only a device to
implement a desired structuring of relations within the political community.
6 Cf. Republic of Congo v. Venne, [1971] S.C.R. 977, 22 D.L.R. (3d) 669 (recognizing
and discussing in an international law context involving sovereign immunity, the distinction
between acts lure imperil and lure gestionis).
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A second difficulty comes from the dual role of those acting for the state
enterprise. To illustrate, consider a counterman for the Liquor Control Board;
on the one hand and probably primarily he is like any retail sales clerk but
additionally he is supposed to withhold supplies from persons intoxicated or
under age, which is a low level decisional and law enforcement function
related to social, not to commercial policy. These create troublesome ambi-
guities. At this point though, we are only concerned to establish the criterion.
A catalogue of activities based on it will come later.
Exclusion from the domain of administration of the operations specified
above does not imply exclusion of what precedes and supports them. Though
retail clerks and sweepers do not administer, sales managers and plant
superintendents do. They address their attention to the relations of persons
within the organization, not just to things or to outsiders. So also with the
staff of the Department of External Affairs as contrasted with ambassadors,
or project co-ordinators as contrasted with laboratory scientists. Some will
find this cautionary note supererogatory in view of the emphasis on organi-
zation as the talisman of administration. It is inserted to make it crystal clear
that what is critical is not the nature of the end product but its nature as an
end product divorced from internal organizational impact.
Public - When Is It?
What administration is private, what public can only be answered for
the particular time and place.
It depends on whether the currently prevailing social philosophy sees
given institutions as organs of the state or as autonomously grounded. Often
discussion is in terms of totalitarianism or liberalism. Resort to such epithets
befogs the fact that as an absolute neither is often urged in theory or ever
realized in practise. It is all a question of degree. Too, opinion on the
subject is always in a state of shimmering flux.
The more numerous the areas of action not seen as civic action, the less
extensive is the domain of public administration. This resembles and senti-
ments about it may be derived from attitudes about whether persons exist
independently of or only in society. The questions are distinct, however.
Our immediate concern addresses itself to groups, not to persons. We must
ask by what warrant the power structure of the group exercises its controls.
If as a vehicle of state authority, it acts by delegation - which may be
implicit - from the state, then it is simply an element of organization, a
mode of public administration. If otherwise based, its administration is not
public administration.
Every social group other than the state exists by its sufferance in the
sense that it could, if it so willed, deny consequential effects to the decision
of the group's power bearers, thus reducing it to at most an ongoing unor-
ganized rally. If everything in the way of organized association which the
state permits depends on that permission and thereby derives from the state,
all administration can logically be claimed to be public administration.
Instead there are examples of powers accepted, recognized, even in
some cases affirmatively bestowed by the state which by common assent do
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not have the effect of making the recipient a part of public administration.
Convention, not logic, fixes the line between the public and the private.
Take the family, for instance. It has been called the basic social unit.
7
It may prehistorically have been the first human group.8 It has suffered sadly
in our urbanizing society yet visibly retains a good deal of vitality. It has
still many vestiges of its traditional organization. Though the paterfamilias
cannot as in Rome put the son to death9 nor even as under the mature
common law bind him out to labour until the age of majority,' 0 if strong-
willed he may assert some control over use of the family car. The socialization
of the child, clearly a matter of public importance, is left to the parents.
Theirs is the direction of his cultural and religious exposures.1 ' By neglect
they may forfeit their jurisdiction and surrender custody to explicitly public
agencies. Legislation has even restructured the family "administration" by
putting the mother on a parity with the father.
In some degree the family certainly is an organization. In some measure
it certainly controls the relations of citizens in matters about which the com-
munity is not indifferent. Public monies are turned over to parents, one
assumes, not as an award for fertility but as an appropriate delegate to expend
for the child's benefit. In other times and places the state has done directly
much of what here and now is left to the family - in Sparta, for example,
or in the kibbutzim. The extended family in our own primitive law was a
chief mechanism for peacekeeping through the device of the kinbote. Some
of the powers of the conseil de famille under French law make it the manager
of important affairs of the members.
Yet the very suggestion that the family functions in any way as an
organ of public administration would raise an outcry. Our ethos finds in it
the embodiment of an order of values anterior and indeed superior to those
of the state.
Other spheres of human activity are accepted by us but not always or
everywhere as none of the public's, that is, of the government's business. Here
freedom of enterprise is an article of faith so business administration is
excluded; freedom of worship is a basic postulate, so religious administration
is excluded. Elsewhere their functionaries too are public administrators whose
7"... Mhe family is the most important social institution of mankind". I Ward,
Dynamic Sociology (2nd ed. New York: Appleton, 1911) 677; cf. 3 Sorokin, Social and
Cultural Dynamics, (New York: Bedminister Press, 1937) 30 C". . . the first fundamental
form of social relationship and of social bond in the organized groups").
8 Cf. Homans, The Human Group, (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1950) 190; McIver,
Society, (New York: R. Long and R.R. Smith, 1937) 201.
9 Kaser, Roman Private Law, trans. Dannenburg. (Durban: Butterworths, 1965) 61;
Muirhead, Roman Law (3d ed. London: A & C Black Ltd., 1916) 27.
0 Day v. Everett (1810), 7 Mass 144 (S.Ct.). At the outset, the father's powers at
common law seem to have been a good deal narrower, see 2 Pollock & Maitland, History
of English Law (2nd ed. Washington D.C.: Lawyer's Literary Club, 1959) 436-37.
11 Final Report, Special Joint Committee on The Constitution of Canada, 4th sess.
28th Parliament 1972 p. 24 ("... There are some matters in which a Government in a free
society may not go beyond persuasion. In our view ... the right of parents to choose their
children's education is a basic human right which no government can encroach upon").
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operations are part of administrative law. A Soviet commissar of industry or
plant manager while addressing himself to much the same type and range of
problems as a corporate board chairman or branch executive in Canada is a
public administrator; his opposite number is not so regarded. The Swedish
Ombudsman's scrutiny of the village parson's dealings with his parishioners,
indeed in our own law that wellspring of convenient platitude, Julius v.
Bishop of Oxford, demonstrates that where the servants of God are state
servants too, their secular status is that of public administrators.
On the other hand, claims to autonomy in the name of academic freedom
have failed. The courts persist in subjecting to the rules governing administra-
tive conduct at least the publicly supported institutions of education including
those of higher education. This probably faithfully reflects our society's
relative downgrading of the mystique of learning as compared with those of
religion or of business. In the Middle Ages it was otherwise and the univer-
sities' claim to stand outside the political community was honoured.
One feature about the business corporation, to return for a moment to
it, seems to deserve special comment. The family, the church, the univer-
sities all arose spontaneously. Their functions though left undisturbed by
and indeed at times encouraged and augmented by the state were not state
created. In contrast every business corporation owes not only all its powers
but its very existence to the state. (Originally, virtually all corporations were
and now again, as the ideal of a controlled economy revives, some of them
in whole and others in part, are contraptions for achieving public ends through
private means.) Such will be dealt with later. Here I am talking only about
the common or garden variety of business corporation - an artificial person,
with the state as artificer. Management's entrenched position despite the
shareholders' hollow "ownership" is state-sanctioned. It is through legislation
that the power of freezing out minorities on a merger is now being acquired.
An understanding that at least the more substantial corporations are all
vested with a public interest is manifested by the general imposition of
conditions on the distribution of their securities. A form of business organi-
zation the corporation may be but it is a form endowed by the state with an
array of special attributes and capacities.
Yet, almost as much as for the family, it would grossly offend received
notions, summed up in the shorthand of free enterprise, to suggest that its
administrators are public administrators. Indeed business administration and
public administration are often seen as fraternal twins together constituting
the whole family of administration.
Most often private administration is so because its institutions realize values
taken as transcendent which supersedes consideration of their role in the fulfill-
ment of the purposes of the political community. Some though is private because
its concerns are trivial. There is for instance, the fraternity pledge master.
Or the sports referee.
The English locution of "domestic tribunals" seems to have originated
in just this dismissal of the trivial. First came the social club. Ways of talking
and thinking about it were transposed to professional associations and, when
trade unions became lawful, to them. The gradual shift of the liberal profes-
sions from informal fraternities of gentry who had a common specialty to
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depersonalized occupational categories, and the continually growing swarm
of quasi-professions and pseudo-professions clamoring for prestige and pre-
rogatives made the analogy less and less apt. Emergence of the trades unions,
which were also treated as "domestic tribunals", as de facto regulators of
access to employment eventually forced a recognition of its absurdity. In
Lee v. Showmen's Guild,12 it was substantially discarded. Legal discourse in
Britain and Canada probably will continue to bear the "domestic tribunals"
scars for a long time. But occupational associations possessing immense power
are no longer to be regarded as "domestic tribunals" along with garden clubs
and other trivialized organizations. Their place in administration can be
examined in the light of their own great importance.
Strangers and Brothers
Some more things must be left out in deference to tradition.
One is the military services. Surely the most rigidly organized and the
least private of activities, they are ordinarily seen as having a unique char-
acter. Military law is put on a separate footing.13 Any mention of those
services is conspicuously absent from standard works dealing with public
administration and administrative law. As hard as it is to justify on logical
grounds their general exclusion, it becomes almost impossible where they
are called on to preserve internal order, to bring Riel or the University of
Mississippi to book. Nor is there a bright line distinguishing the military from
other types of organizations. The train bands and their descendants, the
militia, as well as the RCMP 14 are marginal and cannot be firmly assigned.
Along with the army and the navy, they are usually omitted from considera-
tion. The feeder services for procurement of materiel or recruitment of
personnel seem on the other hand to be taken as engaged in public adminis-
tration. The former attitude suggests that the criterion of what is military is
the mission of providing defense while the latter looks elsewhere for it.
The temptation to apply a purely formal test, inclusion in the regular military
establishment (broadened to include marginally military outfits) fails for
cases like the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers whose major rivers and harbors
functions are not military though the Corps is part of the military establish-
ment, or the Coast Guard, in peacetime engaged in revenue and rescue tasks
under the Secretary of the Treasury, in war charged with coastal defense and
responsible to the Secretary of the Navy. Sometimes structural, sometimes
functional attributes seem to elucidate how to tell a military service when
one sees it. The tendency has been to treat as military and exclude from
public administration everything done within or by an arguably defense
establishment that is directed to an arguably defense-related objective. That
shall be done here, fully recognizing that the distinction is only intuitive.
12 [1952] 2 Q.B. 329.
13 See B. Starkman, Canadian Military Law: The Citizen as Soldier (1965), 43 Can.
Bar Rev. 414. There has recently been a tendency to transport to military law principles
and procedures developed in other contexts, see R. Dickerson, The Codification of Military
Law (1952), 38 A.B.A.J. 1037; Coulet, Le Nouveau Raglement de Discipline G~n6rale
dans les Armies (1968), 84 Rev. Du Droit Publique et de la Science Politique 5.
14See The Queen v. White [1956] S.C.R. 154.
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Courts and legislatures are also by tradition excluded. These lofty insti-
tutions refuse indeed to acknowledge kinship with their poor relations, the
administrators.
But there the genealogical record is. In England, they all stem from
Curia Regis, the undifferentiated royal court. Specialist legal elements were
hived off, first to Common Pleas and King's Bench, later to Chancery and to
the Exchequer which remained a hybrid for centuries. These taken together
composed the central judicial structure whose fusion into a unified court
system is only a hundred years old. True, there was also a network of local
tribunals, assizes, and quarter sessions; there were the humble indigenous courts
baron and borough courts; and there were antecedents of today's self-governing
professional tribunals in the courts of the merchants, of chivalry, of the church.
From the likes of these, our contemporary minor courts eventually grew. Some of
them were, like Curia Regis ancestors of the august royal courts, initially undif-
ferentiated globs of official authority. In their blend of functions, the quarter
sessions of pioneer Canada still showed traces of their descent from the English
local magistracies. Nor was this peculiar to the British strain in the nation's
heritage. The municipal councils of New France, which served as its judicial
tribunals, feeble New World copies in this respect of the parlements of the
Ancien Regime, had important administrative functions as well. 15
Parliament too and all the other legislatures in all the places where the
public law derives from that of England evolved out of the Curia Regis.
Without tracing it in detail, that evolution, with the emergence of the House
of Lords and then the House of Commons, originally to make grants of
money to the King, venturing in turn to humbly petition as well, becoming a
full and finally the dominant partner in legislation, deserves to be recalled
to mind.
Here there is not the blurred boundary which was observed as existing
with respect to the military. Only courts and legislatures are being ruled
out, not the organs of adjudication and legislation.
Latter day separation-of-powers theory has tended to equate them. But
Aristotle ran his line differently; 16 Montesquieu, who by his great work may
almost be said to have invented the theory as a working principle, never
mentioned a judicial power but seems to have lumped it with the executive.
17
15 "Au debut, dans le domaine judiciaire, vu la minime population et l'absence de
cours r~gulieres, les causes se plaident devant un juge et un greffier ad hoc, et tr souvent
devant le gouverneur de Quibec ou celui des Trois-Riviires, Montreal se contente d'une
cour seigneuriale, comme le feront deux ou trois seigneuries. En 1651, Lauzon etablit une
magistrature a Quebec et au Trois-Rivires.... ." 1 Lanctat, Histoire Du Canada (3d ed.
rev. 1962) 398.
16 See Politica, Bk. IV ch. 14 (trans. Jowett) in Basic Works of Aristotle (ed. McKeon,
New York: Random House, 1941) 1225.
17 L'Esprit Des Lois, Livre 11, c. 6 ("II y a dans chaque Etat trois sortes de pouvoir:
la puissance 16gislative, la puissance 6x6cutrice des choses qui dependent du droit des gens,
et la puissance 6xdcutrice de celles qui d6pendent du droit civil. Par la seconde, il fait la
paix ou la guerre, envoie ou regoit des ambassades, etablit la sfiret6, prdvient les invasions.
Par la troisiime, il punit les crimes ou juge les diffdrences des particuliers. On appellera
cette derire la puissance de juger; et 'autre simplement la puissance 6x6cutrice de l'Etat.")
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Truly administrative bodies author subordinate legislation and the power of
adjudication does not make a court, let alone a "section 96 court". Judges
and legislators are exceptionally vested with maverick official duties but,
when they sit and function as courts or legislatures, they customarily do not
think of themselves nor are they thought of as engaged in adminstration save,
indeed, in judicial administration or in equivalent parliamentary procedure,
neither of which is normally studied as a part of administrative law. The
nature of the body, not the nature of the activity, attracts the deferential agree-
ment that administration does not reach so high.
Should one think in terms of two grand divisions of public law, with
constitutional law concerned with that part of the machinery of government
mentioned in the fundamental charter, and administrative law with the rest?
In Britain there is no fundamental charter but there administrative law is all
mixed up with constitutional law. This tends more to support than to dispute
the suggestion. Telling formidably against it, however, are such instances
as the entrenchment in the Australian Constitution of the Inter-State
Commission 18 and the provisions for a wide spectrum of department heads,
boards and commissions in American state contitutions. So this attractively
convenient ground of distinction cannot be fully sustained. Yet it gives some
guidance. The legislatures outside the administrative framework are those the
constitution talks about. The courts excluded are those that are members
of the judicial establishment it contemplates. Note that this is not necessarily
limited to those it creates. The British North America Act creates no courts
and only by pregnant abstention recognize those not "superior, district and
county courts". Yet it, like other constitutions, recognizes the judicial establish-
ment as a distinctive institution composed of courts. 19 These are by tacit assent
conventionally omitted from the world of public administration.
These three dimensions of administration, the first of them, What is
administration? rationally based, the second, What administration is public?,
a screening concept for current social values, the last, What family members
have established separate households?, are purely artificial, but fix the limits
of this inquiry. All who act within those limits are public administrators.
As will appear they come in many shapes, sizes, and colours.
The Extended Family of Administration
The classical and obvious candidates for inclusion are the persons who
operate within the familiar hierarchically structured departments. In parlia-
mentary systems, the Minister at the apex has a somewhat ambiguous status,
while his fellow, the Secretary in the United States, is clearly within the
ranks of administration. So in both cases are all those below from the deputy
minister (assistant secretary) on down.
Is Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 64 and 64 Vic. c. 12, secs. 101-104
(U.K.).
19 British North America Act 1867, 30 & 31 Vic. c. 3, sec. 96-101. For an excellent
analysis of how these provisions bear on the interrelation of the judicial and the administra-
tive establishments, see Pepin, Les Tribunaux Administratits et la Constitution, (Montreal:
Les Presses de rUniversit6 de Montreal, 1969) passim.
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With the subordinate ranks filled as they largely are by civil servants,
there is a naive tendency to think of the civil service, the departments and
public administrators as different names for one thing. Really no two are
identical.
Some civil servants are not connected with departments. Some so con-
nected are not engaged in administration. It is true that nearly everybody
who is engaged in administration in a department is a civil servant. It may
be that almost all civil servants beyond the lowest grades have some adminis-
trative functions whatever their classification - which still leaves out the bulk
of the civil service personnel in some departments. Most civil servants may be
associated with departments and many persons associated with departments
may have administrative functions. Beyond that one cannot properly go.
Yet public administration has generally been seen in the image of the
civil service personnel working within a department. That image is so strongly
fixed that it dominates the thinking of people with quite opposite reactions
to the spread of administration. Some, apprehensive of bureaucracy, draw
the picture of "ministers' powers" operated through an elaborate hierarchy, a
vast civil servant anonymity through whose mindless maze no subject's rights
or liberties can confidently count on passing unscathed. Others, enamored
by scientific management, see as regrettable deviations the forms of adminis-
tration which have grown up outside the departments and address themselves
to constraining everything into that one true pattern. In both cases one
variety of administration is treated as though it were the whole of it. That is
understandable. For one thing, because of its relatively uniform pyramidal
pattern, it is highly visible and intelligibly symmetrical. Moreover, areas of
activity particularly pregnant with political risks and rewards tend to be
entrusted to central departments having a ministerial apex located in institu-
tional and usually in geographical proximity to the supreme political organ.
The tasks left to administrators outside the hierarchy are likely to be less
sensitive politically. Form and content have conduced therefore to highlight
administration through departments and to obscure other kinds.
Identification of administration with this one component, greatly
important though it is, has been bad for the development of a rational admin-
istrative law. The morphology of bureaucracy is as relevant to governmental as
to other large hierarchical strctures.20 To it belong the familiar issues relating
to subdelegation and to the institutional decision. Even more fundamentally, the
internal division of labour characteristic of bureaucratic structures means that
functions are parcelled out. Their character as related components in an
organism established for the implementation of public policy is in danger of
subordination to their own special form where that is adapted to doing things
which resemble the standard operations of "non-administrative" bodies such
as courts. These latter and the lawyers, whose work centres around them,
find it natural to displace the specialized activity from the administrative to
the adjudicatory universe. It belongs in both. The elusive differentiation
20 The attributes and elements of the ideal type, legal authority with a bureaucratic
administrative staff are set forth in Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic
Organization (trans. Henderson & Parsons, London: Free Press of Glencoe, 1947).
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between "judicial" and "merely administrative" decisions inarticulates a
hunch about which of the dual aspects to emphasize.
Choosing a label may be a procedurally necessary preliminary. But the
choice does not alter the hybrid nature of the action. What weight to attach
to each element raises perplexing problems. Discussed in terms of the con-
ventions of "natural justice", they have given rise to the muddle of judicial
decisions and dicta which to many represents the corpus of administrative
law. Recognition of the distinct ends served by each of these universes and
a sophisticated concern for choice and accommodation between them is
needed but unlikely. That goes as well for extradepartmental administrative
organs mired in the same conceptual bog.
Indeed promotion of uncritical conceptualism seems to have been the
worst consequence of confusing administration with what departments do.
The stigmata of bureaucracy have been generalized as being the characteristics
of administration. 21 The legal rules that evolved were expressive of reactions
to them. They have then been applied across the board regardless of the sort
of administrative agency whose action was involved. If clearly inapplicable,
the actor's function as a device for organizing and implementing government
authority is left unheeded and discussion of the activity has proceeded without
reference to the notions familiar in administrative law discourse2
A global survey like this cannot even begin to deal with the details of
the composition of departments. Individually they are too various, collectively
they are too kaleidoscopic for that. Each has its own pattern reflecting the
demands imposed by its particular mission and the human and material
resources given it.23
Typically, each is topped by a minister and a deputy and bottomed by
a field force with horizontal levels and vertical divisions appropriate to its
tasks and its size. In each may be found the uneasy tension between line and
staff, the formal communications network, the routinization of operations,
in sum, all the characteristic features of hierarchical organizations.24 But
the blends differ.
As a group they are in a constant state of flux. Departments are created,
divided or combined, activities and personnel are transferred between them
21 The classic formulation of this attitude in Hewart, The New Despotism (New
York: Cosmopolitan Book Corp., 1929) c. 1 has been repeated in substance many times.
22The relevant materials lie mainly outside judicial decisions and technical legal
writing which do not deal much with these other aspects of official action. See, as repre-
sentative specimens, R. C. McIvor, Canadian Monetary, Banking and Fiscal Development
(Toronto: MacMillan Co. of Canada, 1958) c. 11 and U.B. Bergevin, Gaspd: A Case Study
in Regional Planning (1966), 9 Can. Pub. Adm. 86. Cf. Re St. Lawrence Starch Co. Ltd.
(1971), D.L.R. (3d) 24 (Ont. Sup. Ct.).
23 The multi-volumes Whitehall Series, authored as to each volume by a very senior
civil servant and published by Allen & Unwin - is the most extensive demonstration of
this. For Canada, see 1 Report of the (Gordon) Commission on the Organization of Gov-
ernment in Ontario (1959) passim: Cf. Report of the (Glassco) Royal Commission on
Government Organization (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1965) 48-66.
24 Cf. Urwick, The Elements of Administration (London: I. Pitman, 1944).
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as changing technology or economics or sociology or shifts in pressure groups
strength, or the needs for political fence mending dictate. There would be no
point in undertaking a list of the many federal or provincial departments. What
exists at any given time is only a transition stage. Within the aggregate, depart-
ments interact in areas of overlapping concern. Ad hoe or standing committees
with representation from the interested departments by personnel of appro-
priate, usually equivalent rank are often constituted for such cases. Other
coordinating devices are also used.
The one generalization that can be made about the departments is
that practically everybody connected with them, aside from those who deal
only with things including ideas, is engaged in administration, high, middling
or humble, in a classical bureaucratic context. They are all true bureaucrats;
but this does not mean that they alone are truly administrators.
The members and staffs of boards and commissions are just as
unambiguously so.
In the United States the talk is of "independent regulatory commis-
sions". In Canada and Britain a commoner expression is "independent
tribunals". The different phrasing may reflect a different emphasis in their
characteristic use. The principle of ministerial responsibility, a corollary to
our version of the parliamentary system, may account for that. In the United
States control has certainly been confided to commissions over some matters
which in Commonwealth countries are reserved for ministers. Not wholly
reserved though, for there has been a growing tendency to separate out and
channel to extradepartmental bodies the resolution of claims arising in con-
nection with the carrying out of departmental missions. In the United States
the same impulse has manifested itself in the creation of a corps of hearing
examiners distinct from both the departments and the commissions, which
are treated alike in this respect, who make the initial determination, the
power of ultimate decision still being potentially with the secretary or the
commission although under restrictions. Canadian boards more than American
commissions find their focus in a specialized tribunal function. This has had
verbal consequences on the way people think about them. It may also have
had substantive consequences by affecting the way they think about
themselves.
Still they are used in much the same way in both countries. Besides
the proliferating appeal boards with their special jurisdictions, Workmen's
Compensation Commissions and Labour Boards are found in both. And
Canada too has commissions which are not just tribunals - the Ontario
Municipal Board and its fellows in many other provinces, for instance, or
the civil service commissions.
Some - the Board of Trade in England, the Board of Railway Com-
missioners in Canadazs - were established to relieve the central executive of
regularly recurring, time-consuming chores. Some - the Environmental
25See McLean, National Highways Overland in 10 Shortt & Doughty, ed., Canada
and Its Provinces CToronto: Publishers Assoc. of Canada, 1914) 470-72.
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Quality Administration in the United States26 - integrated bits and pieces
of responsibility previously scattered among departments to make them the
primary rather than an incidental concern of the administering body in the
hope of greater effectiveness. In federal states, some co-ordinate the action
of the central and the member governments to remove obstacles created by
the constitutional division of powers, a form often called intergovernmental
but more properly co-governmental, a participatory mechanism for each
government to exercise its segment of authority over the common citizenry.
The hiving off from departments of categories of action, notably adjudication,
and pioneering of government control into new areas requiring specialist
skills in scarce supply in the established departments accounted for others.
They emerged for many reasons to do many things.
Matters seem frequently to have been shunted to them over which no
minister was eager to claim jurisdiction, as where massive expertise seemed
called for and where public feeling was intense but its drift was obscure.
Where there is an exceptional hazard of coming a cropper, whether from
manifest ineptness or from misjudging the relative dynamics of reaction of
opposing interest groups, a programme's administration is politically unat-
tractive and readily confided to persons who stand outside the hierarchy for
which a minister must answer. At the start such persons are usually recruited
extramurally for their eminence or at least reputed disciplinary competence
having some relevance to the regulated field. The professional orientation of
commission members and staff and the different approach to persons so
oriented, which our public morality accepts as proper, may temporarily
damp down the assertion of interest group claims and in any event deflects
them from the minister.
That is so only for free floating commissions. The boards and commis-
sions established within departments and staffed with departmental personnel
are a different breed. No more than a formal variant of the departmental
hierarchy, they often constitute a collateral duty for departmental members
who have other principal assignments. They differ from committees only in
that their existence and specialized functions tend to rest on statutes or
orders-in-council rather than on ad hoc designation as an occasional con-
venience. Their more formal label and relative permanence may lead to
their developing standard operating routines and thus an illusion that they
have a separate life.
Even extradepartmental boards and commissions must, under a parlia-
mentary system, report through some minister and for budgetary purposes
fall -within the vote to some department. Notwithstanding this fact, they
are outside the departmental machinery. The minister who reports for them
determines neither their staffing nor their policy and is not open to questions
in the House respecting their operations. They are not part of the regular
bureaucracy, but they clearly are a form of administration.
Departmental committees dressed up as boards are seldom if ever given
a distinct legal personality. True boards and commissions often receive
26 See Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, (1970) 3 U.S. Code Cong. & Adm. News
6322-6324 and the accompanying presidential message, id. 6329-6333.
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attributes of a legal entity, such as the capacity to sue and be sued. Such a
board in whose mix of responsibilities adjudication is dominant or prominent
may be made by statute a "court of record". The implications of the term
are cloudy. It clearly does not incorporate the body into the regular judicial
structure, let alone make it a "superior court" but leaves it to function as
still a part of the administrative establishment. Whatever the principle or
the considerations if any which cause such special features to be annexed,
their presence commonly signals exclusion from the bureaucratic hierarchy
but not from public administration.
The independent commission or tribunal seems to be somewhat less
fashionable than it was a while back. More resort is being had to a functional
equivalent, the crown corporation.27
Rather a revival than a novelty, this mechanism carries forward tradi-
tions from the very origins of Canadian history. The Company of New
France and the Hudson's Bay Company were prime examples of the chartered
trading monopolies which at the dawn and noonday of mercantilism were
the favored way of organizing expansion of state (that is to say, of extending
Crown) authority to new lands. Phased out with changes in the economic and
political environment so long ago that their very memory is blurred, the
corporation recurred in various forms and in such special contexts as banks
and transportation as an administrative alternative to more orthodox methods.
It is now in high favour as an instrument for dealing with special situations.
A proposed classification of crown corporations between those which
are enterprises and those which are service oriented is useful and to a degree
serviceable. 28 A crown corporation which essentially operates a business like
other firms in the same line of industry should probably be classed along with
them as engaging in private rather than public administration. This is so
even though some missions, like providing yardstick competition and serving
uneconomic markets that are alien to them may fall to it.
The puzzle comes in separating enterprise from service operations.
Hardly any crown corporation is purely entrepreneurial. A possible exception
might be one set up for the short-run purpose of liquidating surplus stocks.
Another kind which approximates an ordinary firm is one like the CNR or
CBC whose operations are controlled and conditioned by a regulatory agency
having general jurisdiction over the relevant area of activity whether Crown
corporations or private corporations be involved. These are special cases.
A general criterion is lacking. The experience or the prospect of profits or
deficits is not of critical significance. Business firms concern themselves with
satisfying a demand for economic goods at prices which will return more than
the outlays for factor costs, but which typically do not take into account
27Ashley and Smail, Canadian Crown Corporations (Toronto: MacMillan Co. of
Canada, 1965); Friedmann ed., The Public Corporations (Toronto: Carswell, 1954) (com-
parative study of thirteen nations).
28 The distinction between enterprise and other crown corporations is a main theme
of an informative article, Irvine, The Delegation of Authority to Crown Corporations
(1971), 14 Can. Pub. Adm. 556, setting forth in tabular form pp. 560, 561 a classification
of existing Federal Crown Corporations into one or the other type.
[VOL. 10, NO. I
Administrative Law
the value of social goods exploited. Crown corporations, even those which are
primarily enterprises, are all conglomerates marketing both private and
public goods. The Salt Fish Corporation deals both in fish and in the main-
tenance of employment. 29 The Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation
provides construction credit and development rationalization. 30 The Toronto
Transit Commission sells to its passengers transportation and to the com-
munity some mitigation of arterial sclerosis.31 Whether the income flow from
the private demand sector covers the jointly produced public good too, with
a margin over, or whether an explicit separate payment for it, a "subvention",
is required in order to continue supplying the whole package of public and
private goods, is fortuitous, not determinative. Financial accounting does not
give the rule for the assignment of crown corporations between public and
private administration.
The market structure for the particular commodity may be a more useful
indicator. Where it is competitive in the sense that to a considerable extent
private firms are supplying equivalent goods on similar terms, the crown
corporation should perhaps be equated to those other suppliers. Where it
has a monopoly or a virtual monopoly, whether by reason of legal policy or
of serving an uneconomic market, the lack of analogous private enterprise
activity leaves no class of businesses to which it can be assimilated while in
no way affecting its membership in the set of governmental bodies. So it
takes its colour from the latter. Thus Polymer or the Ontario Food Terminal
are seen as components of public administration even though they may be
operated profitably and in general on strict business principles.
This analysis implies that a crown corporation enterprise may combine
private and public administration, indeed even that its managerial personnel
may be engaged now in the one, now in the other.
At some times and places crown corporations supply entirely goods and
services which are elsewhere brought to market altogether by private firms.
This calls for no qualification of the foregoing remarks. What matters is the
organization of the particular political community at a given time and place.
Intoxicating beverages or electricity may be here a state monopoly supplied
by a crown corporation, there an article of private commerce. In taking them
over as its exclusive preserve, the state is not electing to enter into a line
of business. It is electing a method of regulating distribution.
Only the enterprise type of crown corporations presents the ambiguities
just examined. The others unquestionably are simply a special form of
organizing the "service public". That of itself confirms that the corporate
form is adopted simply as a matter of convenience to obtain certain collateral
advantages. This is corroborated by the fact that it is not only used alter-
natively to boards. It is also resorted to, albeit infrequently, to replace more
traditional structures, a development recently exemplified in the case of the
29 See The SaItfish Act: R.S.C. 1970, c. 37 (Ist Supp.), sec. 7.
30 Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-16.
3 l See Kaplan, The Toronto Transit Commission: A Case Study of the Structural-
Functional Approach to Administrative Organizations (1967), 33 Can. J. Econ. & Pol.
Sci. 171.
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post office. Nor does the absence of a corporate charter turn into public
administration government dealings which are standard marketing operations.
Information Canada, like the Queen's Printer before it as a publisher and
bookseller, is just another publishing house. Admittedly its line is specialized
but less so than Carswell's.
That the personnel of crown corporations mostly are engaged in public
administration results not from their corporate clothing. It comes instead
from the circumstances that only a little of what they do finds a parallel in
private entrepreneurial activity. That little can usually be identified and
excluded with relative ease.
What is not at all easy is to characterize for the purpose at hand the
situations where the government farms out to non-public organs the per-
formance of some of its functions or adopts as subjects of official concern
matters originally within the private domain while leaving their performance
to the bodies with which they originated.
A common way of doing so has been by contract. Its use is not new.
It seems however to keep finding fresh applications.
Many, perhaps most government contracts, clearly involve no parti-
cipation in public administration by the government's contracting partner.
The state simply procures goods or services like any other purchaser,
exercising full control over what is done with them after acquisition. The
contract even there may impose policing responsibilities on the supplier by
specifying domestic sources, prevailing wages, or anti-discrimination practices.
But, however effective such contract conditions are to bring about conformity
of the conduct of contractors or subcontractors, actual or aspiring, with
non-economic policies, they do not vest a power but only create a potential
of control in them.
It is the contract that contemplates employment of a private entre-
preneur as a substitute for direct official dealings with the affected public
that smacks of public administration.
Under such a contract, in its classical form, the co-contracting party
was a chosen instrument of the state. Often it was given a monopoly. The
fermiers generaux of the Ancien Regime in France were an old unhappy
instance of the system at work,32 the licenses for the fur trade in early
Canada were an instance where it did iot work.33 The English Statute of
Monopolies was aimed at correcting its abuse.34 The provision of postal
services started under the regime of private contracts.
These examples are antiquarian. But the device is constantly updated
to new uses.
32 The abuses flowing from this policy were a perpetual source of complaint, e.g. 2
Sully, Memoires (ed. Lefbvre, Paris: Gallimard, 1827) 443-445; Vauban, Projet D'une
Dixne Royale (ed. Coornaert 1933) 14; 4 Saint-Simon (ed. Pleiade 1958) 786-788.
33 An interesting account of this phase is to be found in Innis, The Fur Trade in
Canada, rev. ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1956) 63, 83.
34 21 Jac. 1, c. 3(1623).
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In the United States it has been flexibly adapted to the implementation
of the civil rights legislation of the last decade. In Canada the Medicare
programme involves a network of contracts with hospitals and practitioners
of the health sciences, while legal aid is furnished not by government lawyers
but by members of the practising bar who make their services available to
clients under contracts of adhesion with the province. The contract activities
of research foundations defy classification; their organizational links with
sponsoring official agencies range from virtual affiliation to clear indepen-
dence;35 the direct user of their work product is sometimes the government
sponsor, sometimes the wider industrial and scientific community. A private
enterprise used as a middleman for the purveyance of government services
or controls resembles a franchised dealer in private law in being part
independent contractor, part agent. If formal status is the determinant, such
bargaining partners of the state are clearly not within the ranks of officialdom.
If substantive role is, they are clearly fulfilling a recognized government
mission.36 To me it seems a mere question of tactics whether to use the
regulars or the auxiliaries.
The joint enterprise in which the state and private operators are asso-
ciated is a special form of chosen instrument. In post-World War II Europe
it has been a quite fashionable technique for evolving and implementing the
economic plans which figure so prominently there. In many developing
countries it appears, notably though not exclusively in connection withmining, as a way of attracting outside investors without surrendering to them
the national patrimony. It is less often encountered in North America. This
may be because the sentiment that government and business are different
universes is stronger here. Even so, the Comsat sort of venture is a well-
publicized instance of it. In Canada, programmes of development in New-
foundland and in Quebec have flirted with it and it should not be forgotten
that the original version of the Bank of Canada was set up along those lines.
There seems to be little basis for denying to these hybrids the character of
public organisms or to their personnel that of public administrators. A
fortiori this is so where a joint enterprise is used as, for example, under the
Canada Water Act,37 to integrate the initiatives of different levels of
government.
Extragovernmental elements can be enlisted in public administration as
well by the assignment of authority to them as by contractual enrolment for
the exercise of public functions.
35 See Grove, Government and Industry in Britain, 275-76 (1962); Coddington &
Milliken, Future of Federal Contract Research Centers (1970), 48 Harv. Bus. Rev. 103.
The meagre Canadian experience is noted and described in 4 (Glassco) Royal Commission
on Government Organization 291-93 (1963).
36 The Air Transport Association, recognized by the CAB as the valid voice of the
industry to channel and confirm proposals for it, is a particularly subtle form of such
indirect administration, see Redford, The Regulatory Process (Austin: University of Texas
Press, 1969) Ch. 6.
37 The Act, R.S.C. 1970, 1st supp. c. 5, envisages both federal-provincial water quality
management agencies, secs. 9, 10, and purely federal water quality management agencies,
sees. 11, 12, depending on the jurisdictional attributes of the waters involved, with common
functions and powers for each type of agency, see. 13.
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Occupational licensing and discipline are a prime example. Save for
the loose rein of implied assumpsit, the common law was originally content
to leave questions of professional qualifications and competence to be ruled
by whatever group sanctions the corps of practitioners could bring to bear.
The combined pressures of a progressively more interdependent society for
some assurance of a minimum skill level and of the occupational groups for
the benefits of legitimated monopoly brought about a nineteenth century
commencement and a twentieth century culmination of a legislative policy
of officially bestowing on assorted callings the governance of all holding
themselves out to exercise the particular art. Spreading from pilot boards and
the health professions, where hazards to life and limb were obvious, the
practise has fanned out to encompass almost the whole range of service
occupations. The extent of autonomous control, of prescribing and enforcing
the rules applicable to those who engage in the activity, does tend to vary
roughly in line with the status of the activity. Whatever its limits, however,
a statutory warrant enforced when requisite by public sanctions marks those
holding authority in such a group as participants in public administration.
Labour unions, with their sanctioned control over access to employment,
and local marketing boards, with corresponding powers over producer quotas,
are in somewhat the same position. From political considerations mostly,
but to an extent from structural differences as well, recognition of their
administrative role has been delayed. It is only tangential even now. They
were long condemned as conspiracies. They were eventually legislated into
legality but only as voluntary associations without rights, duties, or powers.
Only yesterday comparatively speaking were they set apart from clubs whose
"domestic tribunals" could act by whim so long as they respected contract
terms and rights to share in club assets. In some ways they do differ from
professional governing bodies. Thus, non-compliance with their rules and
rulings attracts no official but only private sanctions - pretty effective ones,
though. Again, with the market for the licensed practitioners' services typically
the dispersed general public, the decrees of their governing bodies have a
patently public bearing, whereas in organizing workers or producers to
bargain with one or a few enterprises, the union or the marketing board
seems to be operating only in the business universe. They look to be and to
a degree are more remote from public administration. Yet it is through the
state that they are vested with control3s over those who seek to work or to
sell and, in exercising that control, it is beginning to be demanded that they
38 "La Convention collective du Code du travail se pr~sente comme une institution
juridique autonome par rapport au droit civil. La rdunion de certaines conditions de fond
et de forme, l'entente sur certains objets - les conditions de travail - lui donnent une
vritable effet r~glementaire. Aux salaries representds par les syndicats et, le cas 6ch6ant,
aux employeurs membres de l'association signataire, elle apparaitra comme un syst~me
de "legislation" privde temporaire. Contrairement 5. la plupart de conventions de droit
priv6 die a sa source dans une obligation impos~e h la fois a 1'employeur et 5. l'association
des salaries. Elle tire sa force obligatoire non pas de la volont6 des parties mais de la loi
elle-mme. Elle ne concerne pas des individus, mais un collectivit6 de salaries, l'unita
de negotiation, qui se maintient sans 6gard au passage des individus dans son cadre.
Elle lie tous les salaries actuels on futurs visas par l'accreditation. Elle aussi 1'employeur
et plus prdcisement son enterprise... 55 Gagnon, LeBel et Verge, Droit Du Travail 235
(1971).
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conform in some respects with what is required of persons engaged in public
administration.
The government employees' union is a very particular case. Until
recently, the fixing of the terms and conditions of government employment
was for unilateral decision by the regular administrative bureaucracy. Now
Canadian governments, following the British lead, negotiate these matters with
organizations recognized as representing the employees. In whatever sense
unions generally are public administrators, these organizations accepted by
the government as bargaining partners are. But, more than that, they share
in making determinations which were formerly at the very heart of public
managerial responsibility. If those who made them before were engaged in
public administration, it is hard to see how those doing it now are any less so.
The process for determination has been reorganized but the nature of the
activity remains unchanged.
Another kind of devolution of authority is represented by referential
legislation which adopts as legal standards the rules from time to time formu-
lated by private groups, as in the reliance on the Canadian Bankers Asso-
ciation for clearing house rules or on the securities exchanges for listing
standards and similar matters. This may be done tacitly though deliberately
as by the SEC decision to leave to the certified public accountants the
formulation of generally accepted accounting standards instead of adopting its
own as the FPC or the ICC chose to do. In such a case, it may be argued
that it is improper to speak of the norm-enacting agency as engaged in
administration since it acts by sufferance. No explicit official consequences
are authoritatively ascribed to what it does. But where a government authority
directs that the determinations of a private group shall fix the standards or
practices for areas of activity, this would seem to incorporate it pro hac vice
in the universe of public administration. It resembles the situation where one
level of government in a federal state delegates the application of its legis-
lation to members of the other's agencies. There, it is true, the persons
selected as delegates are already public administrators rather than being
chosen from the private sphere; but in essence the cases are alike.
Municipalities and educational authorities are in a comparable position.
Unlike systems such as the French, where communes and other local estab-
lishments while retaining a limited, distinct identity are woven into the fabric
of central administration, 39 in the common law world they form in theory no
part of it. Created by it, yes, and dependent on it for the definitions of their
powers and procedures 40 - but in that they resemble business corporations.
In the ancient liberties and franchises of cities and manors and the commu-
nity functioning of parishes there was an array of indigenously based local
39See Rolland, Droit Administratif 141-144 (history), 196-211 (1le ed. 1957); Cf
Medard, Les Communautes Urbaines: Renforcement ou Ddclin (1968), 84 Rev. Du Droit
Publique et De La Science Politique 737. See Tocqueville, L'Ancien Regime 50-60
(Headlam ed. 1949) for a sketch of the historical situation.
40 The historical position is set out in Henderson, Foundations of English Adminis-
trative Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963) c. 1. For the present extensively
modified position, see Griffith, Central Departments and Local Authorities (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1966) Ch. 1.
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authority which some have seen as the guardian against absolutism at critical
times. Like firms, they clearly engaged in administration. Unlike firms, they
were not fingers on laissez-faire's invisible hand and thereby non-public.
To this day municipal administration and educational administration are
largely ignored by general administrative theorists (although recognition
grows as autonomy shrinks). They still keep much of their traditional
character.
Besides their old-line administrative spheres, their volume swollen as
society becomes more urbanized, municipalities are being given added assign-
ments by the provinces and the states. Herein the senior governments adopt
as a policy choice a scheme much like the constitutionally inspired federal-
provincial interdelegation. In each instance an available corps of public
administrators is borrowed for the occasion to do things that alternatively
might be done directly by personnel of the delegating government.
Local administrations tend structurally to be microcosms of those found
in their senior governments. The difference in scale is characteristically
reflected in a simpler pattern, with major reliance on hierarchical structures,
less use of independent organs outside the chain of authority and a less
elaborate specialization of responsibilities. Size is important. Large cities can
be at least as intricately governed as small provinces or even small nations.
Formed by the will of the state but not part of its cadres, local authorities
are public administrators sui generis. In going about their own business, they
are rather conventional specimens. Their territoriality is their common
feature. Within their bailiwick, some have a general authority, others deal only
with specific subjects, education traditionally but joined now by a number of
others particularly in the United States through the device of special districts.
The position of arbitrators is highly particularistic. Voluntary submis-
sions are purely a matter of contract. However fully the award or even the
advance agreement to submit may be enforced at law, that does not remove
them from the business universe or place them in that of public administration.
But where the state specifies that certain matters must be submitted and
furnishes the machinery for doing so, the arbitrator's status is fundamentally
different. With an authority derived from the state, they must in its exercise
conduct themselves in important respects as though they were tribunal mem-
bers. That they act ad hoc does not alter the quality of their action.
All the foregoing examples are representative of those having respon-
sibilities- in connection with the formulation or application or both of norms
creative of legal rights and duties. Called regulatory or adjudicatory in their
more formally patterned manifestations, ministerial or merely administrative
in routine ones, they make up the bulk of the administrator's work. But
administration is not wholly in the imperative mood. Oftener than not perhaps
it may be prescriptive. But sometimes it is indicative.
To distinguish between them is in fact not always easy. Even where
courts are concerned, the declaratory order triggers no process for enforce-
ment yet it is not just a brutum fulmen. For that matter, considered dicta
exert a potent influence.
[VOL. 10, NO. I
Administrative Law
Correspondingly there are functionaries who can in fact compel though
they do not in form command.
The Ombudsman, that current darling of the academics, is a prime
instance. The office has been created in different places with variations as
to what matters he may concern himself with and how he is to be seised of
them. Quite uniformly, however, his functions are limited to admonition and
exposure.41 But only a foolhardy administrator would maintain his position
against the contrary view of a person with the access and the aura of the
Ombudsman. Rational prudence and the native timidity of civil servants
combined have made that a rarety. With the only grist that comes to his
mill administrative action or inaction, his business is plainly public adminis-
tration. True, conversely to the Queen, he governs but does not reign. True,
he is not a civil servant. True too, he is an adjunct to Parliament and outside
the executive establishment. All the same he is a public administrator and by
that very fact rebuts any notion that the factors last mentioned are critical to
that status.
However exceptional, he is not quite unique in his mandate to bark
but not to bite. Social control by means of early warning signals is a stock
administrative technique with a range from mild guide-line statements through
to blunt intimations of imminent sanctions. It is usually found in conjunction
with authority to penalize behaviour departing from prescribed standards.
Most of the familiar kinds of administrators mentioned earlier have such
authority. Advance notice of their reactions to lines of conduct can be on
the one hand useful to advise people how to shape their plans so as to stay
in the clear, but on the other inhibiting of legitimate activity. Its value resides
in lessening the occasions for invoking sanctions. So it is seldom given
unannexed to some power of authoritative decision.
The Ombudsman's supposed uniqueness rests in great part on the
specious notion that he lacks all power of effective control. The picture as
drawn is that of an aloof monitor pursuing an ongoing inquest into the
satisfactoriness of performance of the administrative apparatus.
Were he indeed such, there would be an evident analogy with commis-
sioners (tribunals) of inquiry. Their mission is to inquire and report. The
prerogative until and unless displaced is an adequate basis for their appoint-
ment.42 In Canada they now ordinarily receive their powers by virtue of
statute, often a basic Inquiries Act.43 They must to the extent that compulsory
powers for the production of evidence are to be exercised rely on statutory
warrant. They must keep within the ambit of investigation designated by their
instrument of appointment, their letters patent in case of an ad hoc commis-
sion or the foundation directive in case of a standing appointment.
41 The literature is almost superabundant. For interesting comparative surveys see
Gellhorn, Ombudsman and Others (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966) and
Rowatt, The Ombudsman: Citizens' Defender (2nd ed. London: Allen and Urwin, 1968).
42 See Jellicae v. Haselden (1902), 22 N.Z.L.R. 343.
43 See, e.g. The Inquiries Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-23; The Public Inquiries Act, R.S.O.
1970, c. 379.
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It grossly oversimplifies to lump all investigations together. Some are
indeed what the name implies, the gathering and processing of data on
problems of public concern. They serve affirmatively to assemble materials
as a basis for policy formulation or negatively to smother awkward issues.
Others though focus on individuals. They are in substance a form of discovery
proceeding as a foundation for the imposition of sanctions. This kind,
whether their consequence is public obloquy or derivative judicial proceedings
or once in a while direct effective condemnation, in essence substitutes for or
is a stage in programme enforcement, conventionally effected through more
traditional authorities. Because individual malfeasance and system malfunc-
tioning so often concur, it is hard to assign cases with precision between these
two types. In principle they are clearly different. In both being a part of the
administrative process they are however alike although the relation of what
the prosecutorial investigation does to other administrators is much more
evident.
The role of advisory committees is ambiguous. No doubt anyone in a
position of authority may in general seek counsel wherever he sees fit. But
when an institutionalized organ of consultation is appointed by law, things
change a bit. Ordinarily indeed it is left to the person responsible for the
decision how much or little he will consult or heed it. Still, psychological and
political considerations will incline him to give at least some weight sometimes
on some matters to its views. Advisory committees established within and
staffed from a department are, like other departmental boards, only a variant
of the regular bureaucratic structure. Others composed of or including repre-
sentatives from outside - and there are many such - cannot be so charac-
terized. Yet they too seem properly subject to being described as engaged in
public administration when they act. Whether seen as distant cousins of the
Ombudsman in that they keep the functioning of the functionaries under
scrutiny or as making a policy input by alerting officials to the sentiments of
interest groups or as handymen for sorting out claims arising for administra-
tive disposition - and advisory bodies have been used in all these ways, they
are a planning and inspection adjunct to the regular officialdom.
Besides they can and often do communicate from as well as to the
agencies with which they are associated. This aspect of their action is not
administration at all, hence not public administration. Though administration
signifies the organization of group effort toward the accomplishment of some
end, usually the provision of some good or service, the actual transfer to
consumers of that utility, be it an airplane ticket, a classroom lecture, or
information about official sentiment is no part of administration. It is only its
aftermath. So far as advisory committees transmit information from govern-
ment sources, they supplement and resemble the press. The same may be said
of public information officers whose activities seem no more administrative
than those of postal carriers.
Still, information blends into admonition and, to the extent that advisory
committees enjoy creditability as having a potential for influencing official
determinations, their communications to the public like guide-line pronounce-
ments of the bureaucracy have an administrative quality.
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They are not the only ones who act administratively in some contexts but
not in others. A similar situation has already been noted in connection with
Crown corporations and school personnel.
A prime example is found in the case of judges or ministers functioning
as persona designata. The practice or at least the expression is fairly common
in Canada, less so elsewhere. It occurs where one whose ordinary duties lie in
governmental areas conventionally not classed as administrative is called on
to function in some capacity that is.44 Mostly judges have been used.45 The
type situation is assessment review.46 No one would venture to say that judges
as an occupational group are public administrators. No one denies that when
acting as personae designatae they are public administrators pro hac vice.
An almost unclassifiable category is that of the actors who mediate the
political participation of the citizenry in the process of government. In one
party states, where the functions of the party overlap and may overshadow
the spheres of authority legally assigned to officialdom, it would be most
unrealistic to exclude the party apparatus from the ranks of public adminis-
trators.47 In Western-type democracies, their members do not belong there.
In their nadir the bosses and party machines who controlled patronage and
policies, while perhaps crypto-administrators, yet used puppet administrators
to implement their purposes. Wherever an opposition party is a recognized
legitimate institution, the parties fall outside administration. Like the family,
the church and free enterprise, they stand for a transcendent value, in this case
the freedom to make a political choice.
Electoral incidents which do not curtail that freedom, voter registration
and polling procedures for instance or the determination of disputed elections,
can perhaps be regarded as aspects of the management of personnel recruit-
ment, a standard administrative task. In logic those who work the electoral
machinery seem to belong among public administrators. But this is going too
far. Just as the shareholders of a firm in theory stand above management and
their general meeting is external to business administration, so and still more
the electorate stands above the government organs whose workings are public
administration and whose staffs are public administrators.
Submissions Based on the Evidence as Presented
Neither a desire to swell my list of publications nor an academic delight
at the wonders of administration inspired this discussion. Its object is utili-
44 The concept has received little systematic attention. The main references are
Gordon, Persona Designata (1927) 5 Can. Bar. Rev. 174; Kinnear, The Doctrine of
Persona Designata as Applied to the Ontario Dependents Relief Act (1942), 20 Can. Bar
Rev. 324. Where a court rather than a judge is used in this capacity, the expression used is
curia designata.
45 Occasionally a Minister of the Crown is so used, cf. Gariepy v. The King, (1939)
Ex. C.R. 321.
46 The artificialities and whimsicalities of the Canadian law in this connection are
elucidated in Laskin, Municipal Tax Assessment and Section 96 of the British North
America Act: The Olympia Bowling Alleys Case (1955), 33 Can. Bar. Rev. 993.
47 Cf. Vyshkinsky, The Law of the Soviet State 159-160 (1948, trans. Babb); Miller,
The Rural African Party; Political Participation in Tanzania (1970), 64 Am. Pol. Sci.
Rev. 548.
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tarian. Its recital of the range of matters falling legitimately within the purview
of administrative law exposes how partial and inadequate has been the
standard approach.
This implies no blame moral or intellectual. Loyalty to categories and
concepts whose usefulness has been exhausted is in our professional tradition.
Feudal tenures and their incidents cluttered land law well beyond a time when
they had any relevance. The particularities of debt, detinue and covenant were
critical until the rise of a market economy submerged them under a notion of
enforceable agreements and a law of contract. Legal constructs end up, like
other elegant artifacts, as treasured museum pieces when they are no longer
functional. The old and comfortably familiar are abandoned reluctantly. But
eventually and inevitably they are abandoned.
Social dynamics compels it. Always we back into the future with our gaze
fixed on the past, our retreat into progress marked with bumps and bruises.
It were well instead to take heed of our present position and guide our steps
by observation of the surroundings.
Talk and thought about administrative law have confined themselves to
selected parts of it. These have been chosen for or warped into analogy with
those tidier institutional models, the courts or the legislatures. The great
organizing principles of natural justice (procedural due process) and ultra
vires have been taken over from them. These have served well to cut the
executive down to size. When the state's one important internal task was seen
as the imposition of order, they were effective counterforces in the interest
of freedom. 48
Examples scattered throughout the earlier discussion show that state
action never did take only the forms of coercion and command. Subtler and
more various public controls have long been exercised. But until recently they
were uncommon. Regulation and adjudication swamped them. The fringes of
public administration got scant attention. Administrative law took shape from
templates appropriate to the commoner manifestations. In developing the
ideas of ultra vires and natural justice to reconcile the claims of order and
freedom, there was a true instinct for what was needed in the then situation.
There has been weird extrapolation from those concepts, a cloud of misleading
nonexplanation in the innocent double talk of characteristic discourse. Still
there was a reasonable fit between the principles and standards applied and
the great mass of administrative phenomena with which they had to deal.
They are no longer adequate. They become ever less so. They are not
defective. They are deficient. The state becomes relatively less and less a
master, more and more a manipulator.49 Regulation and adjudication continue
but as adjuncts or alternatives to a heterogeneous array of official interventions
48 . .. The maintenance of public order as an objective of the law declines in relative
importance", Corry, Law and Policy (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin) 25.
49... iTlhe expansion of the range of activities and services in which the various
states are today engaged has blurred the distinction between governmental and non-gov-
ernmental functions or acts or between so-called public and private domains of activity."
Republic of Congo v. Venne, 22 D.L.R. 2d, 3d 669 at 687 (Can. 1971) (Laskin, J.).
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into the life of the community. When the reconciliation of freedom and order
was what administrative law was all about, promotion of inefficiency was up
to a certain point a positive benefit. The stress on rules tending thereto was
healthy. Now it is less so.
What do I propose? Nothing specific, really. Just a whole reorientation.
Examination of the administrative universe has revealed how much of it has
no resemblance to what the current fundamental concepts of administrative
law assume. The devising of more suitable ones calls for a vast concourse of
observation and deliberation. I do not claim to have given or to have the
answers, only to suggest the pertinent kinds of questions.
Even that, it may be objected, is not achieved by a mere list of adminis-
trative actors with a description of their roles. Such an unsorted jumble of
instances is a vexation of inquiry and no guide. The objection is a fair one.
So I shall risk some reflections submitted only as one starting point for further
analysis.
The law applicable to administrative agency operations ought to be
responsible to the formal and functional particulars they are seen to exhibit.
Form and function are often related. Some structures are used oftener and
perhaps are better adapted to some functions. However there is no regular
pattern of use. But, as an approach, a specification of functions and of formal
features commends itself.
The state still has as one very important job the definition and enforce-
ment of rights and duties between individuals. It has the further tasks of
allocating the social increment and of operating the burgeoning public sector
of the economy. For all three its major instrument is the administrative
apparatus in the aggregate.
Certainly it is not the only one. The courts for the first, the legislature for
the second keep their old hegemony. But they were conceived for the simpler
needs of yesteryear. Their available resources of time and skill are fully
employed in discharging their familiar assignments. They cannot be stretched
to include primary handling of the phenomena emerging from increased
urbanization and industrialization. The administrative branch has a wider
potential range. The total administrative apparatus addresses iseif to all three
tasks but individual administrators or agencies may differ markedly. Some are
primarily regulatory, others primarily allocative, others primarily businesslike
and blends of all sorts and degrees occur.
The underlying values central to the functions differ. Their processes
differ correspondingly.
Within the first safeguards for the individual are stressed. The demands
of public order must be qualified by those of personal liberty. It approximates
what courts do. The similarity has tended to blind them and the legal profes-
sion to the other functions of administration and to exalt this one. The result
has been, if not to impose a strict court regime on all administration, at least
to make all administrative processes fit the mold of natural justice. Sometimes
complacency with the usual incidents of trial exaggerates this into a require-
ment of virtual parallelism. The expression "merely administrative" signals a
1972]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
sense that the court analogy is inappropriate. Ordinarily it manifests a
fumbling recognition that protection of individual interests is subordinated to
other values because the relevant administrative action relates primarily to
other functions and is only incidentally regulatory. Conditioned by training
and work environment, lawyers off and on the bench lean toward giving all
administration a regulatory and even a penal cast. Some is accepted as being
only minimally of that character and best left to be ruled by other considera-
tions. The result has been a treatment appreciably though perhaps not grossly
skewed toward the compulsory or prohibitory features of administration and
their consequences for individuals. What is most to be deplored is the absence
of fundamental analysis and explanatory discourse.
The allocative function involves other values and other procedures. It
seeks to effect a satisficing spread of social increments and decrements
amongst the members of the political community. Its governmental archetype
is the legislature. Its techniques are those of bargaining and compromise. The
large accommodations of competing interests at the legislative level are made
thus. Those turned over to administrators differ only in being of limited scope.
The legislatures make policy wholesale, the administrators in the exercise of
this function make it retail. The notion of ultra vires preserves the bargain
which the legislature has struck by restricting ensuing subsidiary compromises
within the range of concerns confided to the administrators. Inside that range
the resolution of claims will reflect the considerations the legislature itself
would respond to were it dealing directly. The calculus of constituency grati-
fication governs. For political parties, properly absent, there are substituted
public representatives, advisory committees or similar artificial equivalents.
In the parcelling out of the social product, an acceptable reconciliation of
discordant pressures is the objective. Ideally the content and the context of
decision are unlike, they may even contrast with those useful in connection
with the function of supervising individual conduct - diffuse and relatively
unstructured where that is focussed, ambulatory where it is definitive, a dredge
for materials of decision whereas that is a sieve. Effective demand for social
- as for economic - goods, whether it be the best or not is the inescapable
determinant of their distribution. Legal rules calculated to frustrate its opera-
tion are ultimately futile and hence unwise. The administrator should not be
hampered in his use of the methods and materials useful for fashioning an
acceptable settlement of competing claims in the social dividend.
Finally, government is big business. As such, it like other businesses
has efficiency as a prime value. Both the courts, preoccupied with the regu-
latory function, and social scientists, sensitive to the allocative function of
administration have at times denigrated efficiency. But it retains a very real
importance. An inefficient, that is, wasteful deployment of resources human or
material in the conduct of public as of private business has nothing to
commend it. That is obvious when government comes to market as an entre-
preneur. It is just as true when it is engaged in activities which have no private
analogues. The collection and retention of redundant and overlapping reports,
the excess stockpiling of personnel or inventory, the self-defeating diffusion of
memoranda and other paperwork - who would question that these are bad
in any connection? Not just in these specifics but in general, efficiency should
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be taken to be a legitimate objective of administrators in all matters relating
to production processes rather than the end product. Other values may still be
given more weight. But that should not be done automatically nor until after
a preliminary functional analysis of the activity involved.
In practice the functions are all jumbled together. Many administrative
actions and almost all agencies are not simply regulatory or simply allocative
or simply conducting businesses. They are compounds. There is room for
difference of judgment as to the relative significance of the different functions
when they coexist. Such a difference of judgment is at the root of the recent
pleas for more stress on regulations and less use of decisions. This is fine if
the disagreement is deliberated disagreement. The essential thing is to dissect
each act of administration to discover its functional characteristics and then
shape the applicable law to maximize the realization of the values special to
its particular set of functions. Most activities will be hybrids. One function
with its values ought not be allowed invariably to swamp the others.
From the catalogue of administrators, formal as well as functional
distinctions appear. They too deserve consideration.
If one could assume diligent infallibility, the formal structure if quanti-
tatively suitable with neither too few nor too many administrators for the
handling of their business would be of little interest. Instead one not only must
assume, one actually observes lethargy and fallibility. Hence the need of some
kind of control to get enough and good enough performance. My postulate is
that no administrator should be exempt from some control mechanism to that
end.
Of the administrative arrangements examined, some lend themselves
more readily than others to internal controls. For all, external controls are
possible. But the need for them and their nature may differ for different
administrative structures.
External controls are more dramatic and the legal profession or at least
the law schools are obsessed with them. Internal controls are vastly more
important, however.
Like freedom from prejudice, good administration cannot be brought
into existence by courts or legislatures. They can at most condemn deviations
considered unacceptable. Overindulgence in pejoratives, "arbitrary" and
"abuse of discretion" has obscured the fact that the greatest shortcomings of
administrators are inertia, procrastination, and slovenly adherence to routine.
Hyperthyroid officiousness is rare. Elaborately safeguarding against active
maladministration is often counter-productive. It aggravates the incentives to
inaction, thereby costing more than it is worth on balance.
The diversities among the kinds of administrators suggest many particu-
lars which seem to warrant investigation into their bearing on internal control
in both its corrective and its dynamic aspects.
In classical hierarchical bureaucracies, there is a potential and an
opportunity for revising l6wer echelon decisions. Its perfunctory exercise is
valueless. A very active exercise is harmful alike in diverting agency resources
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from alternative uses for the reconsideration of a particular item and in
reacting adversely on responsible initial performance. A discriminate exercise
keeps all levels alert to the considerations and the procedures appropriate to
the agency's function as respects the matters at hand. Differences in internal
structure - the number of levels, the pattern of division of labour both for
sections and for individuals, the communications channels, the geographical
dispersion or concentration of staff - may condition the efficiency of the
inherent potential for internal control. Whether and how they facilitate or
impede it needs to be separately resolved for each of them in evolving a
mature system of administrative law.
Whether the administrator whose activity is involved is an individual or a
collegial body may be relevant. For efficiency the former, for representation and
compromise of a range of sentiments the latter would seem to be preferable.
Almost always when authority is vested in an individual, he has bureaucratic
superiors and is subject to check by them. Plural member administration
occurs at least as often outside as within departments. Control by superiors is
lacking where there are no superiors.
There is nevertheless a possibility of internal control of a different kind
where there is an appropriate diversity among members. There is with statu-
tory arbitration boards. Often there is on advisory committees. On standing
boards and commissions, representative diversity is less common. With them
there is a tendency to appoint to membership from the department's staff or
other civil service posts. There is also a tendency to develop over time a
special rapport with their regular client groups. These weaken the operation
of plural membership as a servomechanism reducing the need to rely on
external controls.
Visibility of the administrator to the relevant community can be
important.
In large bureaucratic establishments, anonymity of the participants in
decision is not only characteristic, it is regarded as a desideratum. The
decision is an institutional decision; interventions- from outside are at a cost
to the agency's performance as a system. If the agency task is seen as subor-
dinate to other primary values, that cost may be justified, though such a partial
stultification ought never be inadvertently made. As a rule, the details of
operation are best left to internal supervision. External controls ought to
address themselves to the agency head who will be visible. He is properly
accountable for how it operates but neither he nor anyone can fairly be held
responsible if the particulars of its operations are tinkered with from outside.
Visibility is in itself a kind of external control or, more accurately,
provides an external stimulus for internal control. Administrators who are
exposed to continuous scrutiny by a concerned public - for instance, com-
mittees of adjustment in neighbourhood-sized communities, the Canadian
Radio and Television Commission - in practice are not indifferent to how
that public reacts to what they do. Persons with appropriate professional
qualifications in administering technical or specialized programmes are not
only conditioned by received professional ideals but monitored by their
professional brethren outside government. This check fails, however, in the
[VOL. 10, NO. I
Administrative Law
administration of occupational self-government; there a shared self-interest
inverts the effect of professional scrutiny and supports increased use of
external controls.
The latent potential of the structure for internal control should be
exploited to the maximum. That is the way to raise the general quality of
administration.
The administrative law we have has been too preoccupied with the
prevention of bad administration. The administrative law we need is designed
for the promotion of good administration.
External controls perforce deal mostly with the former. Even for that
they are not very good instruments.
Legislators act when they vote the budget or at long intervals by recasting
an agency's statutory delegations. They seldoni retrench seriously either funds
or powers. They act in relative ignorance of the full particulars of administra-
tive performance. So indeed they must. Growth of the administrative apparatus
has come about principally because government got too big for any legislator's
personal attention. It is only the really dramatic discrepancy, real or alleged,
between administrative performance and public expectations that is subject to
legislative control.
The courts too are an imperfect instrument. Their habitual fixation on
the regulatory function and relative insensitiveness to the allocative and
business functions come naturally since property, civil rights, and criminal law
are their daily grist. Nor is the judicial process in any event well adapted to
the purpose at hand. Its great defect is that it is episodic. The self selection of
litigation is not even a random sampling let alone a systematic quality control
of the administrative work product. By rerouting administration to favour
those who have the means to urge their claims thus, judicial controls can mess
up rational administration. Moreover alacrity in their use chills administrative
vigor and encourages the already endemic sluggishness.
It would nevertheless be foolish either to desire or to expect the discon-
tinuance of legislative or of judicial supervision. Their presence cautions
against laxness in making use of such internal controls as are available. Their
value is in the contingency of discriminating use differentiating according to
the various kinds of administrators and administrative action.
A sketch such as this cannot pretend to completeness. In proposing as a
point of departure for a rational administrative law the work force of public
administration of which a definition is attempted, in instancing important
components central or peripheral of that work force, and in calling attention
to functional and structural elements as possibly pertinent, it is but a preface to
analysis. It serves as a broad panorama. A detailed mapping of the terrain is
needed. The validity of the suggested bases for differentiation calls for
examination, their consequences for elaboration, and no doubt others ought
to be added.
The development of administrative law deductively from a priori proposi-
tions framed in other contexts has failed. An inductive approach is demanded.
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An ever more crowded and complex world has entailed and will entail an
ever more administered world. Dissatisfaction with the institutions of govern-
ment is already disturbingly prevalent. It is urgent that the law about those
institutions shape itself to fit the phenomena rather than keep struggling to
make them fit a body of precepts.
